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Translator’s Foreword 
Translated from Poul Martin Møller, Inledning til en Afhandling om 
Affektationen, in Poul Møller: Skrifter i Udvalg, Vilh. Andersen, ed., (“Danmarks 
Nationallitteratur,” Poul Tuxen, gen. ed.; Copenhagen: Gad, 1930), vol. II, pp. 
390–99. The article dates from 1837.  
Numerals in square brackets are page numbers to the Danish edition. Other ex-
pressions in square brackets are my own interventions, either to disambiguate a 
pronoun or else for clarity. I have broken up long paragraphs into shorter ones. 
All footnotes are my own. 
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Introduction to a Treatise on 
Affectation 
In the reflections communicated here, the author has tried to clarify the 
concept of affectation. But as a not completely superficial reader will easily be-
come aware, that is not what constitutes [the author’s] chief interest. It has been 
his main task to go through the most common phenomena of affectation, both in 
human life generally and in the age particularly. He who has no taste for this kind 5 
of moral natural-descriptions is therefore given timely warning to skip over these 
pages. 
Those who put no value in any other thought than one in which all con-
cepts are brought forth from nothing by an immanent development will naturally 
insist that the concept treated here should appear as the result of a speculative sys-10 
tem indicated in advance. But if they have not ceased to follow along with us, in 
accordance with the warning already given,1 they are asked to abandon their de-
mand, since it is taken to be inappropriate here to give the ground-plan of a tem-
ple [merely] in order to find a hole in it for a poor church mouse. All their theoret-
ical and practical concepts really amount to one [391] concept, since they surely 15 
would have determined the concept [of affectation] treated here within the same 
boundaries as will be suggested in the following. 
The other class of readers, whose individual concepts have led a more in-
dependent existence, each by itself, and have arranged themselves more in the 
form of an archipelago, will probably find a place for these reflections in one or 20 
another group. In the opposite case,2 [the reflections here] could well provide that 
bit of a tremor in the ocean of their thought whereby a little island can emerge and 
last for a half hour’s time. 
Various deep-minded men in our time serve [these latter people], in writ-
ings and conversations, with the word “truth,” which they seem to take in such a 25 
sense that they indicate by it everything that is respectable in human life. On the 
other hand, they condemn so many kinds of unreasonable states of mind as un-
truth or indeed [as] an intrinsic lie that one is naturally made to raise the question 
whether truth for them is merely one of morality’s3 essential sides, or whether all 
                                                 
1 In line 6 . 
2 That is, if they cannot find a place for the notion of affectation developed here among 
the concepts they already have. 
3 I translate sædlig, Sædligheden and related words by forms of “moral” or “morality.” I 
translate moralsk and related words by forms of “ethical.” On two occasions below, this policy 
requires Immoralitet to be gracelessly translated as “unethicalness.” Although in German philoso-
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morality’s conditions are united in it, or whether it is a specific virtue alongside 30 
other virtues. Many who make use of this concept in aphoristic utterances seem 
not quite to have any account of this [question], and there is scarcely any system-
atic writing in which this way of looking at things4 is carried through so that the 
indeterminate concept that hovers here can be taken to have its adequate presenta-
tion in it. 35 
Among the shorter inventories one now and then finds of the various ethi-
cal principles that have been advanced in the history of practical philosophy, one 
could be tempted to believe that the Englishman Wollaston5 had precisely under-
stood [392] ethical perfection as truth.6 But by reading his own work one does not 
find in it the view we are talking about here. Neither is there found any working 40 
out of it in Ammon’s ethical system,7 although on examining his chapter on the 
principle of ethics one will be made to think so. 
A human being’s life has one kind of truth when he follows his natural de-
sire without pretense; he has a higher truth when he has attained virtue (in the an-
cient sense of the word), so that he still gets the content of his actions from his 45 
natural inclinations, but has won such control over them that he maintains a cer-
tain moderation in their satisfaction. The life of the person who with purely ra-
tional autonomy determines all his intentions has a yet higher level of personal 
truth. (It does not have to be proved here that this cannot happen by a merely sub-
jective thinking, but [only] in such a way that the subject recognizes, as a work of 50 
the same reason that is his will’s proper truth, the rational order that [even] with-
out his cooperation is in his development in existence.) Finally, to the extent that a 
human being’s pure self-determination is the will sanctified by religion, he acts in 
perfect harmony with the whole world of reason—that is, what ought to be—and 
his life cannot attain a higher truth. But this truth is nothing else than morality, 55 
and all deviation from it is immorality. Affectation is certainly a kind of this im-
morality. But we have to determine more closely what place it occupies in this 
larger circle. 
The human being who has affectation in his life does not to that extent de-
termine himself with perfect ethical [393] freedom; his actions do not have their 60 
source in the true self that is his free moral will. His will is determined by one or 
                                                                                                                                     
phy of this period, the distinction between Sittlichkeit and Moralität is often significant, Møller 
does not seem to basing anything important on the distinction here.  
4 The reference seems to be to the view of “truth” as indicating everything respectable in 
human life. See line 26 above. 
5 William Wollaston (1659–1724), the author of The Religion of Nature Delineated 
(1722). 
6 Presumably this is the view that “all morality’s conditions are united in [the word 
‘truth’],” the second of the three alternatives listed in lines 29–31. 
7 Christoff Friedrich von Ammon (1766–1850), German philosopher and theologian. 
Ammon looked for a middle ground between “rationalism” and “supernaturalism,” holding that 
there must be a “rational supernaturalism” that gradually developed Christian doctrine in accord-
ance with the advance of knowledge and science. I have not identified the particular chapter re-
ferred to here. 
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another merely natural purpose by which he is made to depict an alien8 person or 
to take on a false role he is not assigned in life. 
It belongs in the first place, then, to affectation’s essence that it is false-
hood.9 But not [just] any falsehood is affectation. He who, with clear conscious-65 
ness that he is lying or dissembling, makes himself guilty of lying or dissimula-
tion does not show any affectation. We are by no means hereby saying that affec-
tation is any slighter vice than dissimulation accompanied by clear consciousness. 
In what follows, it will turn out that one degree of affectation presupposes less 
unethicalness than [does] methodical dissimulation, while in another degree there 70 
is shown greater unethicalness. 
Affectation then is not unblended falsehood, but always has an admixture 
of self-deception. For it lies in the concept of affectation that the person strives to 
be what he cannot be. But he cannot strive for it without fancying to himself at 
least for a while that he can be it. But entirely innocent self-deception, which is 75 
without any falsehood,10 can just as little be called affectation, so that the two giv-
en components—falsehood and self-deception—always are found combined in 
[affectation]. 
(It ought to be a superfluous remark [to say] that entirely involuntary 
movements cannot possibly be counted as affectation, and that consequently ab-80 
normal reactions that on account of the mental life’s lack of control over the bodi-
ly not infrequently [394] escape a human being completely against his will must 
be excluded [from affectation]. Yet it is not infrequently that one hears such un-
natural and inadequate manifestations of the inner life labeled with the name ‘af-
fectation’. 85 
(We are thinking here in the first place of all the outward movements that, 
on the basis of organic defect, do not stand in the relation to the person’s repre-
sentations, thoughts and feelings they would stand in if the body were in its nor-
mal state. Examples of these are clumsy movements of individual limbs, involun-
tary muscle-twitches, errors in speech, and so on, which together the rabble count 90 
as affectation. 
(Under the same rubric belong a number of abortive reactions that are just 
as innocent in kind, although even reasonable people not infrequently pass a 
judgment of condemnation on them. Among them one can count every dispropor-
tionate manifestation of feeling that becomes disproportionate because the person 95 
either continually or under certain circumstances lacks the ability to find the ap-
propriate expression for his mood. Such mistakes can just as little be counted 
among ethical defects as a foreigner’s words when he from lack of fluency with 
the language happens to make use of improper or offensive remarks. A human 
being of low standing, who is not used to finding himself in society with people of 100 
rank, often bows too deeply, not because he wants to display great veneration but 
                                                 
8 “Alien” (Danish fremmed) and related words are to be understood in the sense of “not 
one’s own” (compare the term “alienation”). The notion of being a non-citizen is of course not 
involved here, much less the notion of being an extraterrestrial. 
9 Understand “falsehood” in this discussion in contrast to the various levels of “truth” 
discussed in lines 43–56. 
10 See n. 9 above. 
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because he does not have the customary skill at estimating the angle of inclination 
accurately. 
(In a conversation, he who remarks that he involuntarily happened to ex-
press himself too harshly and strongly toward another, will sometimes make his 105 
offense good again, but because his blood has now once [395] got out of equilib-
rium, he displays a good will that is not entirely meant, even though the unfortu-
nate correction can have its source in striving to show his true heart. 
(Not everything in a human’s reactions that in this way are not contained 
at all in the subject’s preceding representations of them can be called affectation. 110 
In such cases a human only succumbs to a struggle with nature’s necessity, inso-
far as the external organs refuse to obey his free will’s commands.)11 
If we treat the degrees of affectation according to their greater or lesser 
connection with the subject’s character, then [the subject] has the least possible 
share of [affectation] when [the affectation] is struggling against the tendency of 115 
the will but in the individual moment escapes the human being12 because his vir-
tue has not become proficient. Such a manifestation of affectation stands in the 
same relation to the affectation that has become a habit as [a state of] drunkenness 
does to intemperance, and there is scarcely any mortal who does not, at least in 
youth, sometimes make himself guilty of small, half-involuntary dishonesties of 120 
this kind. 
If there is anyone who from the very beginning of his development so pre-
serves his independence that he even avoids the form of affectation that lies near 
the borders of love-worthiness, so that he for example, never forces himself, out 
of a wish to agree completely with a boyfriend or girlfriend, to sympathize with 125 
them13 more then he is able, then he must certainly have by nature a very strongly 
marked individuality. But whether he therefore has the most favorable tempera-
ment is another question. His talent for preserving his individuality pure and free 
of irrelevant fillers14 can also have its [396] origin in an egoistic propensity to 
confine himself15 merely to his own thoughts and [in] a lack of ability to open his 130 
mind to alien influence. 
He who is not in a position to give himself all at once to others in such a 
way that for a while he remains at one with them, goes out of himself and loses 
himself in an alien circle of consciousness, can surely by his holding back save 
himself from being overcome by any spiritual power. But the individuality that 135 
can be rescued only in this way always remains extremely one-sided and poor. 
Spiritual perfection, just like physical growth, can only be advanced by the indi-
vidual’s regularly mixing together with what is alien to him and apparently sacri-
ficing his self in order, enriched, to turn back home again to himself. 
                                                 
11 The preceding five paragraphs are all a single parenthetical paragraph in the Danish. 
12 That is, succeeds in overcoming the will and breaking through anyway. 
13 The word is dem, which is plural, even though, like the English, the Danish requires 
the singular. 
14 Conjecturing Tilsætninger for the edition’s Tilsætniner. 
15 indeslutte sig. The expression is related to Kierkegaard’s Indesluttehed, which the 
Hongs translate as “inclosing reserve.” In ordinary Danish it means merely “reserve” or “reti-
cence.” 
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But it can indeed certainly happen that an able-minded youth can turn 140 
back to himself from such a fruitful self-forgetfulness, where he has let someone 
else command the course of his thought with the appearance of notions and feel-
ings that are repudiated by his own true ego but that he forces on himself in order 
to enjoy the charming pleasure of sympathy. The manifestations of affectation 
that result in this way could often become precisely the basis for a strengthening 145 
of the personal life’s truth, insofar as he who has inadvertently overstepped his 
personality’s boundary because of dissatisfaction with himself is brought to a 
clearer consciousness of what he feels, wants and knows, and to stronger self-
propulsion in similar circumstances. He who has been on this side of the border 
now is first rightly acquainted with where the border is. 150 
Such a transient manifestation of affectation that has its source in a force 
that dazzles feeling, which a human being by subsequent reflection denies of him-
self as something [397] that does not belong to his essence, and which [he] is on 
guard against in the future, is a lesser fault than actual lying. (Momentary affecta-
tion.) 155 
A higher degree of affectation takes place with him who has acquired a 
habit for a certain kind of false manifestations insofar as he imagines himself to 
have certain purposes, interests or inclinations because he for one or another ex-
ternal reason wishes to have them. For instance, when one from vanity lies him-
self into love for one or another art he has no sense for, or when relatives and 160 
friends of a fanatic pass for being like-minded with him, although his fervor is 
foreign to their hearts and under altered circumstances would pass away on its 
own. The possibility of self-deception here depends on the logical consistency 
with which the acquired role is pursued. But the center that supports such a sphere 
of representation falls outside the subject himself. 165 
This second degree of affectation is in an ethical respect not at all less im-
putable than the lie or representation accompanied by clear consciousness. For 
[the fact] that it is not brought to full consciousness merely comes from the fact 
that the person in question does not want to bring it to consciousness. This is men-
tioned because a highly incorrect concept of this has come into circulation, inas-170 
much as a lot of people believe there lies in self-deception enough justification, or 
at least excuse, even for open vileness—a view the incorrectness of which is easi-
ly seen when one pursues it to some of its undeniable consequences. 
It follows from this, you see, that one should be able to push his falsehood 
so far that it becomes honesty again, and that he who lies so long that he himself 175 
believes his fabricated stories should to this [398] degree become better, because 
his lie is transformed into self-deception. According to this way of looking at 
things, a judge could also in all innocence let himself be bribed, since he merely 
had to bring himself by means of sophisms to believe that his benefactor was 
right. 180 
The persuasion cannot be very profound that has its origin in inclination. 
This already appears from the fact that the effect in general does not last longer 
than its cause. It is not improbable that he who finds a literary work bad, because 
he thinks his enemy has written it, will find it very good if he finds out that his 
friend is the author of it. But that in the first case he found it bad was surely not 185 
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any innocent mistake, no matter how much self-deception there was in it. For one 
ought to follow his inclinations against reason and truth just as little in his as-
sumptions as in his actions. 
Under this second degree of affectation a human being takes a false ele-
ment up into himself and distorts his personality, so that its expressions do not 190 
cohere with his real self. To the extent that he thus has a double interior—a real 
one that is suppressed, and an apparent one that he wants to hold good for [both] 
himself and others—he leads in the final analysis only an apparent-life. (Estab-
lished affectation.) 
The last mentioned [kind of] affectation can yet, even where it is pushed 195 
furthest of all, allow that the person has an enduring appearance of inward coher-
ence, both for the subject himself and for others. But there can be such an appear-
ance of consistency only momentarily in the third and worst degree of affectation. 
That takes place where a human being does not have one or another feigned trait 
in his character, where he does not have the habit of a determinate [399] kind of 200 
affectation, but has a proficiency in affectation in general, which now assumes 
this, now that determinate form. 
This vileness approaches more or less, according to its greater or lesser 
development, to complete untruth in personal life. If a human being could reach 
its culmination-point, then there would not be any lasting nucleus in his thinking 205 
and willing. Rather he would form for himself in each moment of his life a tempo-
rary personality, [only] to annul it in the next. He would indeed, like some ani-
mals, generally shift colors according to his surroundings and to that extent be the 
passive product of his conditions. But since this is only one of the affectation’s 
forms, its course would not be able to let itself be calculated according to the sim-210 
ple rule that he should resemble his surroundings, since affectation can also ap-
pear  in a striving in his conduct to represent the peculiar, the unusual. 
No one can succeed in this perfect lie in the inner life. But if anyone 
could, it would be an ethical suicide whereby a human being completely annihi-
lated himself as a distinctive figure in the ethical world. (Changing affectation.) 215 
